View full-textĪmerican Progressive History is the first book to relate the story of Progressive history through all its transformations from its emergence in the early 1900s to its demise in the 1940s. In fact, given what I call the Complex Subject Thesis, physical ultimates are the least likely candidates for being subjects of experience, for experience, I contend, is an embodied phenomenon. Ultimately, however, Strawson fails to make the case that this relation of determination implies that physical ultimates are - themselves - subjects of experience. Strawson is also correct that there must be facts about the physical phenomena that constitute an experience that determine that it is the experiences it is - or indeed any experience at all. In fact, twofold-access theory, as I construe it, does not so much imply a pan-psychism as a local- or neuropsychism: there are physical phenomena that are experiences, experiences only directly accessible to one when they are events in one's own brain and body. However, despite Strawson's suggestion to the contrary, Feigl distinguishes his view from panpsychism. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an intrinsic, experiential side. theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity.

This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism.

Jude thomas hardy